Recently, an enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem was proposed by Rhouma and Belghith. This paper demonstrates that the enhanced cryptosystem is not secure against the following three different classical types of attacks: chosen plaintext, chosen ciphertext, and known plaintext. In the three attacks, only a pair of (plaintext/ciphertext) was needed to totally break the cryptosystem.
Introduction
Chaos theory has been applied in many different research areas, such as physics, mathematics, engineering, and biology [1] . The distinct properties of chaos, such as ergodicity, quasirandomness, sensitivity dependence on initial conditions and system parameters, have granted chaotic dynamics as a promising alternative for the conventional cryptographic algorithms. The close relationship between chaos and cryptography makes chaotic encryption a natural candidate for secure communication and cryptography [2] [3] [4] . Chaosbased cryptography is relied on the complex dynamics of nonlinear systems or maps which are deterministic but simple. Therefore, it can provide a fast and secure methods for data protection, which is crucial for multimedia data transmission over fast communication channels, such as the broadband internet communication [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] .
The chaos-based cryptographic algorithms have suggested some new ways to develop efficient image-encryption schemes [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . While most of these schemes are based on low-dimensional chaotic maps, it has been proposed recently to use high-dimensional chaos namely spatiotemporal chaos, which is modeled by one-way coupled-map lattices (OCML).
Owing to their hyperchaotic behavior, such systems are assumed to enhance the cryptosystem security [15] .
A 2D CML (coupled map lattice) chaotic model [16] has a good pseudorandom property, which is regarded as of high security in data encryption and has been widely used in secure communication and multimedia encryption. For the W × H lattice, the model is defined as: 
where i and j are the row and column of the lattice, respectively, n is the time point, 0 < ε < 1, μ = 4, 0 y n . Recently, Lian [17] proposed an efficient image/video encryption scheme based on the 2D CML in a kind of spatiotemporal chaos system. However, Rhouma and Belghith [18] pointed out that Lian's cryptosystem is not secure to chosen ciphertext and chosen plaintext attacks [19, 20] because of the weaknesses in the generation of the keystream. To eliminate the weaknesses, they also proposed an enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem with PCBC (propagating cipher-block chaining) mode [21] [22] [23] . Nevertheless, by analyzing the algebraic description of the enhanced cryptosystem, this study has found some drawbacks in its structure. Indeed, a chosen plaintext attack, a chosen ciphertext attack, and known plaintext attack can be done to decrypt the ciphertext without any knowledge of the main secret key values. Therefore, this paper points out three different types of attacks to break the enhanced cryptosystem described in [18] . In the proposed three attacks, only a pair of (plaintext/ciphertext) was needed to totally break the cryptosystem.
Review of the Enhanced Cryptosystem
This section gives a detailed introduction of the enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem proposed by Rhouma and Belghith [18] . The enhanced cryptosystem can be divided into 2 phases, that is, encryption and decryption as shown in Figure 1 .
Encryption Phase.
A 2D CML [16] in a kind of spatiotemporal chaos is used in this phase.
(1) Given a master key K = k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k 127 composed by 128 bits, the lattice is initialized as the same way in [2, Section 2.2.1].
(2) 64 chaotic sequences (s i, j n ) are generated by iterating the spatiotemporal chaos system of (1) according to the following method:
with t 1 > 0 to improve the initial-value sensitivity.
(3) The produced 64 sequences are quantized into one integer sequence and 63 binary sequences. The binary sequences were quantized according to the following method:
for i, j = 0, 1, . . . , 7, (i, j) / = (0, 0), and n = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, where N is the converted vector length of the image of size X × Y which will be encrypted. 
where p i, j −1 = 0. (7) Set n = n + 1 and repeat steps (5) and (6) until the encryption of all the plaintext blocks.
Decryption Phase.
The decryption process is symmetric to the encryption process, but replace (4) by the following:
for i, j = 0, 1, . . . 
Cryptanalysis of the Enhanced Cryptosystem

Kerchoffs Principle and Four Classical Types of Attacks
Kerchoffs Principle. Based on Kerchoffs principle [19, 20] , there is a general assumption that the cryptanalyst who is cryptanalyzing a cryptosystem always knows exactly the design and working of the cryptosystem and then he/she can know everything about the cryptosystem except the secret key.
Four Classical Types of Attacks.
There are four classical types of attacks [18, 20] which are ordered from the hardest types of attack to the easiest as follows.
(1) Ciphertext only attack (COA): the cryptanalyst possesses a string of ciphertext C.
(2) Known plaintext attack (KPA): the cryptanalyst possesses a string of plaintext P and the corresponding ciphertext C.
(3) Chosen plaintext attack (CPA): the cryptanalyst has obtained temporary access to the encryption machinery. Hence, he/she can choose a plaintext string P and construct the corresponding ciphertext string C.
(4) Chosen ciphertext attack (CCA): the cryptanalyst has obtained temporary access to the decryption machinery. Hence, he/she can choose a ciphertext string C and construct the corresponding plaintext string P.
In each of these four attacks, the final objective of the cryptanalyst is to determine the key that was used. It suffices that one of the attacks is successful to consider an algorithm insecure. 
PCBC (Propagating Cipher
-
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Keystream:
Master key: The operation of the algorithm in the PCBC mode is described in Figure 1 , and the encryption and decryption routines are as follows:
where E s (5) and (6) of the encryption phase. From (7), each encryption operation based on PCBC mode can be performed as follows: 
Because m i, j n = 0, the obtained ciphertext D i, j can be rearranged as follows:
. . . 
where d i, j −1 = 0. For example, each keystream can be obtained as follows:
. . . Simulations results of breaking the cryptosystem in a scenario of CPA is given in Figure 3 which shows a total recovering of the image (Lena) of size 128 × 128.
Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA). This subsection describes how the keystream
2 · · · of the decryption algorithm can be recovered using a chosenciphertext attack. The attack consists of two steps. First, S i, j is recovered. Then, the attacker uses S i, j to recover the plaintext P i, j from the arbitrary encrypted ciphertext C i, j . The flowchart of the chosen-ciphertext attack is given by Figure 4 .
Recovering the Keystream S i, j .
Suppose that the attacker has temporary access to the decryption machinery. by using (19) with the plaintext-ciphertext pair: Simulation results of breaking the cryptosystem in a scenario of KPA is given in Figure 7 which shows a total recovering of the image (baboon) of size 128 × 128 by using the knownplain-image (jet) of the same size. 128 ⊕ 128 = 10000000 ⊕ 10000000 = 00000000 = 0. Therefore, to prevent the proposed attacks in the enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem, IV must be known to both the sender and receiver but be unpredictable by a third party. That is, IV should be generated randomly each time and should not be reused. For maximum security, the IV should be protected against unauthorized changes. This could be done by sending the IV using ECB (electronic codebook) mode encryption with master key K.
Conclusions
This paper has demonstrated three separate ways to completely break an enhanced spatiotemporal chaotic image/video cryptosystem. The paper proved that the secret keystream 
